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Abstract 
This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and 
experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that scientific creativity—
like other forms of creativity—is structured and constrained by prior ontological 
expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful epistemic tool to overcome 
these constraints. While current research on analogies in scientific understanding focuses 
on near analogies, where target and source domain are close, we argue that distant 
analogies—where target and source domain differ widely—are especially useful in 
periods of intense conceptual change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies 
from the history of science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists 
like Darwin, and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What mechanisms underlie scientific creativity; what enables scientists to make 
significant contributions to their disciplines? The quest by philosophers of science for 
some rationale behind scientific discovery and creativity has been recently joined by 
cognitive scientists (e.g., Simonton, 2003). Both examine what guides the scientific 
process and in what ways it resembles or differs from ordinary, everyday thought. 
Experimental psychological studies suggest that creativity is not unconstrained and 
limitless but structured by prior assumptions (Ward et al., 2002). Given that scientists are 
subject to the same cognitive limitations as other people, we argue that scientific 
creativity is likewise structured and constrained by prior expectations. Still, the 
occurrence of scientific innovations (on the level of the individual scientist) or of 
paradigm shifts (on the level of the scientific community) clearly indicates that scientists 
are able to overcome these constraining factors.  
Whereas the focus of recent research on scientific creativity has been on near analogies 
(e.g., Dunbar, 1997), we show that distant analogies play a role in the scientific creative 
process, especially in periods of intense conceptual change. In our view, distant analogies 
constitute epistemic actions, which render problems more tractable by replacing the 
unfamiliar conceptual space of the target domain by a more familiar and therefore more 
congenial source domain. We start out with a survey of structured imagination in 
everyday cognition, and the role of intuitive ontologies. We then examine how people 
overcome the constraining effects of intuitive assumptions by distant analogies that apply 
the structure of one domain onto a different target domain. Finally, we provide three 
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examples from the history of science to illustrate that analogies from widely diverging 
domains play an important role in scientific creativity. 
 
 
2. STRUCTURED IMAGINATION 
 
2.1 Creativity Is Structured 
In his seminal study, Ward (1994) asked college students to imagine extraterrestrial 
animals. Their creations possessed characteristic attributes of Earth animals, such as 
sense organs, legs and bilateral symmetry. In one follow-up study (Ward et al., 2002), 
subjects were asked to imagine tools that might be used by a highly intelligent species of 
extraterrestrials, with the following two constraints: the tools are not to be operated by 
power sources, and the creatures are not to have arms, legs or other appendages 
comparable to Earth animals. Despite these constraints, most participants relied on 
typical tools, such as hammers, saws and wrenches that were only slightly modified to 
allow the creatures to wrap them around their heads or hold them in their mouths. 
Subsequent interviews with the subjects revealed that a large majority heavily relied on 
specific examples of animals and tools to guide their creative process. The tendency to 
rely on existing knowledge as a guide to creativity is termed structured imagination 
(Ward, 1994). This finding has been replicated in many studies, even in children as 
young as five years of age (Cacciari, Levorato & Cicogna, 1997). 
Creativity in more natural settings displays the same pattern of structured imagination. 
Religious ideas do not exhibit an unlimited cultural variability, but are constrained by 
prior ontological expectations. As Boyer (2001) already observed, there are no gods that 
only exist on Wednesdays. Religious concepts only exhibit minimal deviations from 
ordinary categories. Thus, gods and other supernatural agents are invariably 
conceptualized as having desires, emotions and intentions; they conform to a normal 
belief-desire psychology. What makes them exceptional is their minimal violation of 
category-based expectations, such as ghosts walking through walls (agents with a normal 
belief-desire psychology who nevertheless violate physical expectations). Barrett and 
Keil (1996) found that Christian believers have difficulties representing their god 
consistently as an omniscient, omnipresent being: they intuitively distort stories about 
him to fit expectations they have of normal people, such as that he can only attend to one 
event at the same time. The historian of technology Basalla (1988) has amply 
demonstrated that newly invented devices are nearly always based on existing artifacts. 
This is why archaeologists (e.g., O’Brien & Lyman, 2000) can study the evolution of 
artifacts as if they were organisms, using the same methods as paleontologists who study 
the origins, gradual morphological changes and extinctions of biological species. Product 
design works by tinkering, not by radical restructuring, which is not always 
advantageous: the tendency of design engineers to pattern new devices after earlier 
solutions often leads to suboptimal designs (Jansson, Condoor & Brock, 1993). 
 
2.2 Intuitive Ontologies 
The discussion above shows that existing conceptual spaces constrain creativity to an 
important extent, but it is less clear from where these conceptual spaces originate. A 
growing number of studies in cognitive anthropology (e.g., Boyer, 2000) and 
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neuroscience (e.g., Caramazza & Mahon, 2003) suggest that the way humans parse the 
world is not arbitrary or even solely governed by external reality, but rather that our 
inductive inferences rely on intuitive ontologies—a limited set of category-based evolved 
expectations that emerge early in development and that guide our reasoning about 
physical, psychological and biological phenomena. Ontology is the philosophical study of 
what is, i.e., what kinds of entities there are in the world, and how different categories of 
entities are related to each other. The question of how particular objects relate to 
universal properties is an ontological question (say, a particular cat and cats as a species). 
Human category-based inference mechanisms are ontologies in the sense that they 
provide a set of expectations of how specific kinds of objects will behave—they are 
termed intuitive because they are not the product of deliberate reflection or scientific 
investigation. Examples of intuitive ontologies include folk psychology (expectations of 
how agents will behave), folk physics (inferences of how inanimate objects move) and 
intuitive biology (expectations of how livings things behave and develop).  
Intuitive ontologies are often associated with computationally complex survival 
problems, including finding food, avoiding predators and handling tools. Rapid and 
efficient identification and reasoning about them have significant survival and 
reproductive advantages. New, Cosmides and Tooby (2007), for example, demonstrated 
that subjects are substantially faster and more accurate at detecting changes in complex 
scenery when animals (e.g., pigeons) were introduced or omitted compared to inanimate 
objects, even vehicles, which they have been trained for years to monitor for sudden life-
or-death situations in traffic. As this efficiency could not be accounted for by differences 
in lower-level visual characteristics or expertise, the authors assumed that people might 
have an advantage in animal categorization by virtue of the ancestral importance of this 
ability, regardless of its current utility. Based on the existing literature, to date the best 
candidates for intuitive ontologies include animal, plant, artifact, person and body part 
(see Capitani et al., 2003, for an overview). Each of these domains contains a distinct set 
of assumptions, which means that inductive inferences made for objects belonging to one 
domain cannot be transferred to another. Neuropsychological studies (e.g., Farah & 
Rabinowitz, 2003) indeed indicate that patients with focal brain injury sometimes lose the 
ability to reason about animals and plants (e.g., they forget the names of plants and 
animals and cannot answer questions like “do eagles lay eggs”), while their knowledge of 
artifacts remains intact. In contrast, some patients with semantic dementia forget what 
artifacts are for (e.g., “is a pencil for writing or eating”), while their knowledge of 
animals and plants remains excellent (Capitani et al., 2003). As imagination about 
organisms and tools is structured by intuitive ontologies about these domains, this likely 
limits the scope of our creativity, as can be gleaned from the studies on imagining 
extraterrestrials and their toolkit.  It seems highly unlikely that our evolved cognitive 
capacities would be widely off the mark (Quine, 1969). Nevertheless, there are 
indications that intuitive ontologies are built for speed rather than accuracy. In many 
cases, laypeople and children are satisfied with shallow accounts that are not explanations 
at all, as in the case of teleological explanations (e.g., eyes are there so that we can see, 
rain exists so that plants can grow), where the function is seen as a necessary and 
sufficient explanation of the structure under consideration (Lombrozo & Carey, 2006).  
 
2.3 Analogies in Everyday Creative Thought 
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How do we overcome the constraints of conceptual structures while being creative? 
Neuropsychological research suggests that creativity does not depend on a single 
cognitive process or mechanism, but rather on the interaction of several cognitive 
processes (Vartanian & Goel, 2007). Indeed, a variety of cognitive mechanisms underlie 
creativity, such as analogical and metaphorical reasoning or conceptual combination. In 
this paper we will focus on analogical reasoning, our ability to understand new 
observations or concepts by mapping the structure of existing domains onto them 
(Gentner, 1983), like Niels Bohr’s analogy between the structure of an atom (target 
domain) and the structure of the solar system (source domain), the well-known orbital 
model. Analogies can be considered as epistemic actions: they are performed to gain 
insight into a problem, which turned out to be impossible through an exploration of the 
original conceptual space. In contrast to pragmatic actions, which are performed to alter 
the world because of some intended physical change (e.g., driving from home to work), 
epistemic actions (e.g., driving around in order to explore one’s new neighborhood after 
moving) are mainly performed to aid and augment cognitive processes (Kirsh, 1996). 
Analogies enhance our cognitive processes as they widen or alter the conceptual space in 
which problems are phrased. 
 
3 INTUITIVE ONTOLOGIES AND SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY 
 
3.1 Intelligibility 
Dear (2006) has argued that modern science comes in two distinguishable guises: 
instrumentality, or usefulness, and intelligibility, or providing accounts of how ‘things 
really are’. These two components together foster a profound trust in modern science. 
Why is science efficient? Because it is true. How do we know that scientific beliefs are 
true? By virtue of their effective instrumental capacities. It is a circular argument, but 
invisibly so. Of these two guises, intelligibility plays an important part, because science 
has taken over the role of natural philosophy to account for natural phenomena not just in 
ways that are internally consistent, but that somehow seem right, make sense or feel 
intuitively true. De Regt and Dieks (2005) claim that understanding constitutes the main 
epistemic aim of science. They contrast science with a hypothetical oracle, whose 
predictions always turn out to be true. Although in this case empirical adequacy is 
ensured, we do not speak of a great scientific success since we cannot understand how 
these perfect predictions are brought about. Scientists clearly want more: they want to 
grasp how predictions are made, and develop a feeling for the consequences of theories in 
concrete situations. Indeed, in the history of science, approaches were rarely pursued on 
the basis of instrumental effectiveness alone. Children and laypeople sometimes resist 
scientific ideas that they find unintelligible, because their evolved cognitive architecture 
cannot adequately deal with them (Bloom & Weisberg, 2007). For example, children 
have the useful belief that unsupported objects fall downward, but this makes it difficult 
for them to conceptualize the world as a sphere. As a result, children create hybrid 
models of the world that match their intuitive understanding of physical phenomena, but 
that also conform to the spherical view of our planet, such as a hollow sphere or a disc-
shaped earth (Vosniadou, Skopeliti & Ikospentaki, 2004).  
The effects of intuitive ontologies are not restricted to children: they linger in educated 
adults. In the case of intuitive physics, even physics students continue to apply the wrong 
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but internally consistent impetus theory to predict the outcome of physical events. For 
example, they erroneously predict that a ball that is being swung in a circular path will 
continue to fly in a circular trajectory (Liu & MacIsaac, 2005). Intuitive ontologies may 
also play a role in scientific understanding. Cross-culturally, people hold the intuitive 
belief that humans are fundamentally different from all other animals (Anggoro, Waxman 
& Medin, 2005). Paleoanthropologists and archaeologists, who are not immune to this, 
indeed often invoke exceptional mechanisms for human evolution (De Cruz & De Smedt, 
2007). Our intuitive ontologies lead us to perceive some accounts as more intelligible and 
more epistemologically satisfying than others. Given that one of the most important aims 
of science is to make nature intelligible, we can expect that intuitive ontologies will 
continue to play a role in scientific understanding. 
 
3.2 Analogies and Scientific Creativity 
Case studies from the history of science and field studies of scientists at work indicate 
that scientific creativity draws on the same cognitive resources as everyday creativity 
(Simonton, 2003). Scientists often resort to analogies. It is useful at this point to draw a 
distinction between near and distant analogies. A near analogy is one in which target and 
source come from the same or a closely related domain. In a distant analogy, target and 
source come from widely diverging domains. Early work on scientific creativity tended 
to focus on distant analogies, such as the snake analogy mentioned by Kekulé in his 
discovery of the benzene ring, or Rutherford’s comparison between the structure of our 
solar system and that of an atom (the planetary model). Yet, upon closer scrutiny, it 
turned out that these analogies were not crucial in these discoveries. A fundamental 
difficulty of the research on historical scientific creativity is that one has to rely on 
retrospective accounts, written years or even decades after the discovery was made. It is 
only in rare instances (such as Darwin’s notebooks) that written documents provide a 
reflection of the creative process in progress. Despite these limitations, which apply to 
any examination of historical material, the use of non-superficial analogies is well 
established both in scientists at work and in laypeople (Dunbar & Blanchette 2001). Thus 
it seems plausible that written records provide an (albeit incomplete) record of analogical 
reasoning.  
Current studies suggest that scientists mainly work within the bounds of their conceptual 
structures. Dunbar (1997) studied creative scientific thought in action in molecular 
biological labs. He found that near analogies form the most important source of creative 
insight, such as the analogy from a well-understood virus to a lesser-understood virus to 
predict how it would behave in specific circumstances. In contrast, distant analogies were 
rare and served explanatory purposes, rather than epistemic ones. For example, one 
molecular biologist likened a polymerase chain reaction to the well-known analogy that a 
group of monkeys equipped with typewriters, given enough time, will type a sentence 
from Hamlet. Dunbar (1997, p. 488) therefore concludes that “creative ideas and novel 
concepts arise through a series of small changes produced by a variety of cognitive 
mechanisms … Conceptual change, like evolutionary change, is the result of tinkering.” 
The central role of near analogies accords well with classical accounts of scientific 
discovery, which suggest that the bulk of scientific work takes place within the bounds of 
existing well-delineated conceptual structures (e.g., Lakatos, 1978). Scientific 
imagination, like everyday creativity, is structured. Most of scientific progress takes place 
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in mental hops, rather than leaps (to use the terminology of Ward, 1998). In other words, 
most scientific creativity exhibits relatively little deviation from the source domain, and 
preserves most of the properties. What role then do distant analogies play in scientific 
discovery if near analogies alone can explain scientific progress? The molecular 
biologists Dunbar (1997) investigated could draw on a wealth of well-understood 
mechanisms and observations. But this is not the case for scientists working in new 
domains where near analogies are unavailable. We propose that in these instances, distant 
analogies can and do play a vital role.  
Take Kepler, who attempted to explain why planets further from the Sun moved more 
slowly within the then new heliocentric Copernican model. Discarding the ancient idea 
that planets moved fixed on heavenly spheres, he introduced the concept of vis motrix, a 
precursor of gravity. To explain this concept, he drew on an analogy with light. The 
source domain of optics was fruitful because optical phenomena were better understood 
than the solar system: 
 
Let us suppose then […] that motion is dispensed by the Sun in the same proportion as 
light. Now the ratio in which light spreading out from a centre is weakened is stated by 
the opticians. For the amount of light in a small circle is the same as the amount of light 
or of the solar ray in the great one. Hence, as it is more concentrated in the small circle, 
and more thinly spread in the great one, the measure of this thinning out must be sought 
in the actual ratio of the circles, both for light and for the moving power (Kepler, 
Mysterium cosmographicum 1596, cited in Gentner et al., 1997, p. 16). 
 
Another example is Stanford and Iris Ovshinsky’s invention of the threshold switch (a 
successor to the transistor) by analogy of the human nerve cell. During the early fifties, 
the Ovshinskys recognized that plasticity of the nerve cell’s membrane plays a crucial 
role in the neuronal basis of human learning. Based on their observations, they created a 
thin film of amorphous disordered material as the analogue of the cell membrane, and 
used this mechanical analogue to create the threshold switch. During this research, the 
Ovshinskys ventured into a radically new domain of science, that of amorphous 
disordered materials, whereas other scientists working in the domain of semiconductors 
still focused exclusively on crystalline materials. The creative use of distant analogy in 
this scientific process is plausible, since Stanford Ovshinsky had a keen interest in the 
neurophysiology of mammals, artificial intelligence and cybernetics, and actively 
corresponded with scientists working in these fields (Hoddeson, 2007). These cases 
suggest that distant analogies can play a role in periods of intense conceptual change or in 
the invention of radically new technological devices, when scientists cannot rely on 
established examples to draw near analogies from.  
Because analogies are epistemic actions, performed to make problems more tractable by 
mapping them onto existing conceptual spaces, we expect that the source domain will be 
more familiar than the target domain, rather than the other way around. For example, 
scientific knowledge on the human mind has only seriously improved during the last 50 
years with the advent of the cognitive revolution, primarily driven by computer scientists, 
who attempted to construct a robust science of intelligent behavior and behavioral 
biology. The structure and functional properties of the human mind, and of animal minds 
in general, remain as yet rather poorly understood. In contrast, our knowledge of how 
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rigid objects behave (mechanics) has been expanding steadily since Antiquity. Since the 
human mind is less understood than mechanics, we should expect that mechanical 
analogies for the human mind will be more fruitful in the context of scientific discovery 
than vice versa (see 4.3). 
 
4 DISTANT ANALOGIES AS A SOURCE OF CREATIVITY IN THE EARLY 
STAGES OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT FORMATION 
In scientific domains where formerly intuitive ontologies played an important role, 
distant analogies may have been of crucial importance to move away from well-trodden 
paths. In this section, we examine how the mapping of widely diverging source domains 
into target domains can foster conceptual change by three case-studies: Harvey’s 
mechanical and weather analogies in early modern physiology, Darwin’s population 
biology and wedge analogies in evolutionary theory, and the use of mechanical analogies 
in the understanding of the evolution of the human mind by evolutionary psychologists 
and cognitive archaeologists.  
 
4.1 Early Modern Physiology 
A first example to illustrate how distant analogies can help us overcome intuitive 
ontologies is the use of mechanical analogies in early modern physiology. Experimental 
psychological studies (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2004) show that people are intuitive 
vitalists: they believe that vital power is taken from food and water and enables living 
things to sustain themselves, grow and prevent illness. Young children often explain the 
functions of internal organs in purely vitalistic terms, e.g., the function of the heart is to 
sustain the life of its owner. Regardless of their cultural background, up to the age of five, 
both Australian and Japanese children prefer vitalistic over mechanistic explanations of 
bodily functions (Morris, Taplin & Gelman, 2000). This vitalistic stance is also found in 
the work of ancient physicians. Claudius Galenus of Pergamum (2nd century AD) made 
significant contributions to our knowledge of blood circulation by dissecting animals. He 
studied the movements of the heart, the action of the valves and the pulsative force of the 
arteries. According to Galen, there are two kinds of blood: the dark type, found in the 
venous system, served as nutrition of the body. The lighter type, found in the arterial 
system, carried blood that was abundant in vital spirits. However, he failed to describe 
human circulation, which involves the transit of blood from the right to the left ventricle 
through the lungs (Khan, Daya & Gowda, 2005). 
It was only in the early 17th century that the precise dynamics of circulation were 
discovered. Prior to the 16th century, internal organs were still mainly understood in 
vitalistic terms. The Renaissance revival of ancient texts included treatises on mechanics, 
such as Vitruvius’ De architectura (ca. 25 BC), which contained accounts of hydraulics 
and water pumping engines, next to Archimedes’ seminal works on mechanics. As a 
result, knowledge of hydraulics expanded rapidly during the early modern period, 
enabling the draining of the Low Countries. This permitted cardiovascular physiologists 
of that time to draw from this well-understood domain to unravel circulation, at that time 
poorly understood. The Paduan anatomist Benedetti published a paper in 1502 on the 
action of the heart valves, which he likened to unidirectional sluice gates in a canal: 
“three valves are purposefully placed by nature like movable gates which by turns when 
the heart is contracted in emitting blood do not completely shut off its passage, for these 
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valves close inward” (cited in Novell, 1990, p. 397). Another Paduan anatomist, 
Aquapendente, compared the action of the venous valves to a dam or a mill sluice. One of 
his pupils, William Harvey, used a variety of analogies to reason about circulation.  
Although his idea that the heart was like a pair of water bellows (not a pump, as is 
popularly assumed) was not novel, his colorful use of analogies, often from the domains 
of mechanics or physics, enabled him to make a more precise formulation of how human 
blood circulated. In his lectures to the College of Physicians, for example, he likened the 
mechanism of an erection to the inflation of a glove, and the working of lungs and thorax 
to a bladder within a bellows. Interestingly, the lectures are in Latin but many of these 
analogies are written out in English. In one of his lecture notes he wrote “From the 
structure of the heart, it is clear that the blood is constantly carried through the lungs into 
the aorta as by two clackes [a kind of pump with one-way valves] of a water bellows to 
rays water” (cited in Novell, 1990, p. 379). In De motu cordis, first published in 1628, 
chapter 4, Harvey wonders why the ventricles and auricle contractions in the mammal 
heart are so well-adapted to each other and responds with two mechanical analogies: 
“Nor is this for any other reason than it is in a piece of machinery, in which, though one 
wheel gives motion to another, yet all the wheels seem to move simultaneously; or in that 
mechanical contrivance which is adapted to firearms, where, the trigger being touched, 
down comes the flint, strikes against the steel, elicits a spark, which falling among the 
powder, ignites it, when the flame extends, enters the barrel, causes the explosion, 
propels the ball, and the mark is attained—all of which incidents, by reason of the 
celerity with which they happen, seem to take place in the twinkling of an eye”. 
In the preface of De motu cordis Harvey draws a microcosm-macrocosm analogy 
between the weather cycle as understood by Aristotle and the circulatory system. This 
analogy, Gregory (2001) argues, was more than a simple rhetoric device; it enabled 
Harvey to understand the difference between the two types of blood, venous and arterial. 
Whereas this distinction did not pose a problem for Galenic physicians who understood 
circulation mainly in vitalistic terms, it posed a dilemma for Harvey who had to make the 
constant interconversion of the two types of blood plausible. From what was known 
about anatomy at that time, Harvey was unable to explain this, but the Aristotelian 
weather cycle provided an apt analogy. According to Aristotle, qualitative and cyclical 
changes from water into air and air into water could occur by evaporation and 
condensation. Just as the sun in the macrocosm plays a causal role in this process, so does 
the heart convert the blood in the microcosm by pumping it through the lungs. This 
analogy permitted a closed system for circulation, whereas Galen’s system, where the 
heart consumes the blood, remained open. These analogies from mechanics and physics 
enabled early modern anatomists to steer away from the intuitive vitalism that dominated 
early anatomical research. The idea that complex biological systems can be represented 
in simple mechanical terms was a fundamental shift in physiology, which remains 
important to this day.  This shows how closely related understanding and scientific 
creativity are: by using these mechanical analogies, Harvey came to understand puzzling 
features of the human circulatory system, thereby enlarging medical knowledge.  
 
4.2 Early Evolutionary Biology 
Humans across cultures believe animals to possess a species-typical immutable ‘essence’ 
that guides their behavior and development. From the age of three, children adopt an 
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essentialist stance when reasoning about animals and plants, and even social categories. 
When one asks a four-year-old whether a kangaroo, raised by goat foster parents, will 
hop or climb, the child correctly predicts that it will exhibit kangaroo-typical behavior 
(Ahn et al., 2001). Intriguingly, children are often more essentialist than adults. Five-
year-olds believe that French babies brought up by English-speaking parents will grow up 
to speak French (Gelman, 2004). This bias leads to similar folk taxonomies across the 
world, organized on the basis of underlying species-typical essences rather than 
superficial appearances (Atran, 1998). The widely held belief that species have 
unchanging essences has long impeded evolutionary accounts that hold that species can 
evolve into new species. Virtually all taxonomists prior to Darwin were species 
essentialists and despite their expanding taxonomical knowledge, they made little 
conceptual progress (Stamos, 2005). Essentialism is difficult to rhyme with the view that 
species can evolve into different species, which may in part be responsible for the 
enduring appeal of creationism and intelligent design. Indeed, even children from non-
religious families spontaneously come up with creationist accounts for the origin of 
species (Evans, 2001). 
The great innovation of Darwin and Wallace was to move away from this essentialist 
stance by adopting population thinking, where species are not idealized classes of 
entities, but groups of individuals that differ in their ability to survive and reproduce. 
Population thinking is an analogy that applies Malthus’ theory of human population 
dynamics to organisms in general. In brief, Malthus (in An essay on the principle of 
population, first published in 1798) reasoned that food resources increased more slowly 
than population growth. Generalizing this observation to organisms in general, Darwin 
realized that animals and plants too have greater reproductive potential than available 
resources allow. As a result, organisms will compete for the same resources, and hence 
heritable traits that are advantageous will spread in the population, because their bearers 
will outcompete those that do not possess them. In the introduction to the Origin of 
species, Darwin (1859, p. 5) made his use of this analogy explicit. Likewise, in his 
autobiography, Wallace, co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection, stated 
explicitly that he would never have hit upon his theory were it not for reading Malthus 
(Wallace, 1905, p. 240, 360). Prior to these authors, biologists did not notice populations 
but focused on individuals. Linnaeus and others made standard idealized descriptions of 
species of animals and plants, such as ‘the daisy’, ‘the honeybee’. It seems remarkable 
that taxonomists should have overlooked the individual variation within species, given 
that they studied dozens of specimens before making a detailed description of a given 
species. Yet well into the 19th century, virtually all biologists were essentialists. This led 
pre-Darwinian taxonomists to ignore or downplay the natural variability that species 
exhibit. Our intuitive essentialism privileges the underlying hidden essence of an 
organism, not its outward appearance. The skillful use of distant analogies enabled 
Darwin and Wallace to overcome these intuitive ontological assumptions. 
Darwin struggled to understand how this Malthusian population pressure could result in 
evolutionary change (Millman & Smith, 1997). At first, he found it hard to envisage how 
“a multiplication of little means” could bring about the great effect of evolutionary 
change. To get a better grasp, he used the mechanical analogy of the wedge: 
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there is a force like a hundred thousand wedges trying to force every kind of adapted 
structure into the gaps in the œconomy of nature, or rather forming gaps by thrusting out 
weaker ones. The final cause of all this wedgings, must be to sort out proper structure & 
adapt it to change (Darwin, 1838). 
 
The wedge analogy also appears in the first edition of the Origin of Species: “The face of 
Nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed 
close together and driven inwards by incessant blows, sometimes one wedge being 
struck, and then another with greater force” (Darwin, 1859, p. 67). Interestingly, Darwin 
dropped this analogy in subsequent editions; perhaps because by then he had developed a 
nearer analogy, namely between natural and sexual selection (in the latter, the selective 
pressures are performed by potential mates rather than the external environment). This 
editing process also reveals an interesting interplay between analogies as epistemic and as 
explanatory tools: whereas in the notebook (not intended for publication), Darwin used 
the wedge analogy in an epistemic context, he later adopted it as an explanatory device, 
which was subsequently dropped in favor of a near analogy.  
 
4.3 The Evolution of the Human Mind 
Once the target domain becomes better understood, distant analogies lose much of their 
epistemic usefulness and near analogies predominate. Indeed, an analysis of historical 
case-studies on multiple analogies in evolutionary biology (Shelley, 1999) reveals that 
near analogies, such as inferences from extant species to extinct ones (e.g., from 
ungulates to horned dinosaurs) are more common than distant analogies. As we have seen 
in the case of Darwin, the latter are largely restricted to the early stages of scientific 
creativity. Therefore, we expect that distant analogies in contemporary scientific practice 
are mainly restricted to areas of research that possess an as yet underexplored conceptual 
structure. One candidate for such a domain is the evolution of the human mind. Despite 
important advances in our understanding of how the human brain evolved, its 
evolutionary origins remain as yet poorly understood. Thus, we can expect that authors 
who propose models for this domain will resort to distant analogies. Cosmides and 
Tooby’s analogy of the Swiss army knife is a well-known distant analogy for human 
cognition that maps the artifactual onto the psychological domain: 
 
The mind is probably more like a Swiss army knife than an all-purpose blade: competent 
in so many situations because it has a large number of components—bottle opener, 
corkscrew, knife, toothpick, scissors—each of which is well designed for solving a 
different problem (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 60). 
 
According to them, there are sound evolutionary reasons to expect the human mind to be 
made up of several dedicated domain-specific cognitive systems as specialized systems 
are better at solving distinct problems than a single processor: “We have both cork-
screws and cups because each solves a particular problem better than the other. It would 
be extremely difficult to open a bottle of wine with a cup or to drink from a cork-screw” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 58). It remains to be seen whether these analogies were 
epistemic rather than merely explanatory in nature. Nevertheless, although they were 
aware of nearer analogies, such as multiple specialized cognitive systems in birds and 
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primates proposed by Sherry and Shacter (1987), they continued to draw analogies from 
the artifactual domain, such as cognitive modules like ‘elegant machines’ (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1995).   
 
 
The cognitive archaeologist Mithen’s Prehistory of the Mind (1996) provides a further 
illustration of the use of distant analogies for epistemic purposes in the study of the 
evolution of the human mind. Mithen develops two elegant analogies. One 
conceptualizes human evolution as a play, divided into different acts (reminiscent of 
Shakespeare’s analogy of human life as a play in As you like it); it is mainly explanatory 
and organizational in nature. As Dunbar (1997) already noted, distant analogies often 
serve purely explanatory purposes, and this seems to be the case here: “Six million years 
[the period of human evolution since the split between humans and chimpanzees] is a 
vast span of time. In order to begin comprehend it, to grasp its salient pattern of events, it 
helps to think of those events as constituting a play, the drama of our past” (Mithen, 
1996, p. 17). Accordingly, the book’s chapters are organized into four acts, beginning 
with a dimly lit empty stage, representing the as yet unknown last common ancestor of 
humans and chimpanzees, and ending with a dramatic act representing the last 100,000 
years, which sees the evolution of Homo sapiens, its expansion out of Africa, the 
appearance of art and, finally, the emergence of agriculture. 
More interesting for our discussion is the second distant analogy Mithen develops, that of 
medieval church and cathedral architecture to understand how, according to him, human 
cognition changed from domain-specific to domain-general. This second analogy is much 
more crucial for Mithen’s understanding, as, by his own account (1996, p. 63) it played 
an important role in the development of his theory of human evolution, which briefly 
stated claims that specialized domains of intuitive knowledge (in this paper referred to as 
intuitive ontologies) merged in the course of human evolution. Mithen uses the different 
phases in medieval architecture, with which he is familiar, as source domain to explain 
features of the evolved human mind, an unfamiliar target domain.  
 
During my summer vacations when a student I worked on the excavation of the medieval 
Benedictine Abbey of San Vincenzo in Molise, Italy. I supervised the investigation of a 
particularly complex building, known as the  ‘South Church’. […] We deduced that there 
had been five phases in all, spanning the first 1,000 years AD and culminating in an 
elaborate multistory building housing many of the precious relics of the Abbey. […] 
When I look at the evidence about the modern mind provided by the psychologists, I am 
reminded of our work at the South Church of San Vincenzo—or indeed any modern 
church or cathedral (Mithen, 1996, 63).  
 
Mithen discerns three phases in the evolution of the human mind, which closely 
correspond to three phases that are often distinguished in the history of individual 
churches or cathedrals. In the first phase, the mind is like a central nave (as in the simple 
one-room churches in late classical and early medieval times), without any specialized 
cognitive capacities. A second phase witnesses the building of multiple ‘chapels’ of 
specialized cognitive capacities around this nave, in close analogy to the building of 
chapels in Romanesque churches. These include domain-specific capacities for reasoning 
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about social life, artifacts and natural history. Pursuing this distant analogy, Mithen 
argues that these domains do not influence each other:  
 
A critical design feature of these chapels is that their walls are thick and almost 
impenetrable to sound from elsewhere in the cathedral. There is no access between the 
chapels. In other words, knowledge about distinct behavioral domains cannot be 
combined together (Mithen, 1996, p. 69).  
 
Hominids from this phase, such as Homo ergaster, cannot reason across domains, which 
would explain why they did not make specialized tools, but rather general-purpose tools 
such as handaxes. In other words, since the artifactual and biological domains could not 
communicate, these hominids could not develop specialized hunting tools. The third 
phase is marked by a partial demolition of the separating walls between the distinct 
cognitive domains, so that information from one domain can flow to others. Here, the 
analogy draws on the transition from Romanesque to Gothic architecture, where the 
thick, heavy walls between the chapels were replaced by thinner columns. The 
differences between the minds of the second and the third phase are analogous to those 
between Romanesque and the succeeding Gothic cathedrals.  
 
In Gothic architecture sound and light emanating from different parts of the cathedral can 
flow freely around the building unimpeded by the thick heavy walls and low vaults one 
finds in Romanesque architecture. […] Similarly, in the Phase 3 mental architecture, 
thoughts and knowledge generated by specialized intelligences can now flow freely 
around the mind […] [T]he result is an almost limitless capacity for imagination. So we 
should refer to these Phase 3 minds as having a ‘cognitive fluidity’ (Mithen, 1996, p. 71). 
 
Cognitive fluidity is exemplified in animism (endowing inanimate objects with a desire-
belief psychology), totemism (merging social and biological domains by making animals 
ancestors to current human groups) and anthropomorphism (endowing animals with 
human properties). According to Mithen, this third phase started about 60,000 years ago, 
when we see the first material evidence for across-domain reasoning, including 
specialized hunting tools which reveal a cross-fertilization of natural history knowledge 
and technology (e.g., harpoons for specialized fish capturing), and the emergence of 
therianthropes in art (half-human, half-animal creatures such as the 33,000 year old ‘lion 
man’ from Hohlenstein Stadl, Germany) which reveals a crosstalk between the social and 
biological worlds. In The prehistory of the mind the medieval cathedral analogy seeks to 
unify two hitherto unrelated facts about human cognition in a single explanatory 
framework: the fact that earlier hominids did not possess specialized, standardized tools, 
and the propensity of cognitively modern humans to frequently cross ontological 
boundaries in their reasoning. In both cases, authors have probed the evolutionary origins 
of the mind using distant analogies for epistemic purposes. Interestingly, none of these 
models apply analogies from psychology; rather they draw from heterogeneous domains, 
notably artifacts and architectural history. Note that such explorations of conceptual 
space are not always successful: in 1976, Dawkins coined the term ‘meme’ in analogy 
with ‘gene’ as a means to study cultural transmission. However, current models of 
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cultural evolution have not taken up this notion of replicating autonomous units of 
culture. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
We have argued that scientific creativity draws on the same cognitive resources as other 
types of creativity: existing conceptual structures constrain scientists in their creative 
process. As a consequence, scientific creativity mostly works with small incremental 
steps, rather than revolutionary leaps. An important class of conceptual structures are 
intuitive ontologies, which guide our thinking about physical, psychological and 
biological phenomena. As experimental studies and the history of science reveal, they 
sometimes impede scientific progress. To overcome these cognitive limitations, scientists 
can apply distant analogies in which the ontologies of source and target domains differ 
widely. By presenting problems in terms of a different ontological category (e.g., the 
phrasing of organic functions in mechanical rather than biological terms), scientists can 
overcome their intuitive assumptions (e.g., vitalism) and offer solutions that are not 
possible in the original conceptual space. This is especially useful in the early stages of 
scientific creativity, when intuitive ontologies still play an important part, and in poorly 
understood fields of inquiry. 
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